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Abstract. Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) ar-
chitecture is based on public-key cryptography. A secure DNS zone has
one or more keys to sign its resource records in order to provide two se-
curity services: data integrity and authentication. These services allow to
protect DNS transactions and permit the detection of attacks on DNS.
The DNSSEC validation process is based on the establishment of a chain
of trust between secure zones. To build this chain, a resolver needs a
secure entry point: a key of a DNS zone configured in the resolver as
trusted. Then, the resolver must find a path from one of its secure entry
point toward the DNS name to be validated. But, due to the incremental
deployment of DNSSEC, some zones will remain unsecure in the DNS
tree. Consequently, numerous trusted keys should be configured in re-
solvers to be able to build the appropriate chains of trust.
In this paper, we present a model that reduces the number of trusted
keys in resolvers and ensures larger secure access to the domain name
space. This model has been implemented in BIND.
1 Introduction
Domain Name System (DNS) [1,2,3] is a distributed database mostly used to
translate computer names into IP addresses. The DNS protocol does not include
any security services such as integrity and authentication, which let the protocol
vulnerable to several attacks [4,5,6]. Therefore the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) has developed the DNS security extensions (DNSSEC).
DNSSEC architecture [7,8,9,10] uses public-key cryptography to provide in-
tegrity and authentication of the DNS data. Each node of the DNS tree, called
a zone, owns at least a key pair used to secure the zone information with digital
signature.
In order to validate DNS data with DNSSEC, a resolver builds a chain of
trust [11] by walking through the DNS tree from a secure entry point [12] (i.e.,
a trusted key statically configured in the resolver, typically a top level zone) to
the zone queried. A resolver is able to build a chain of trust if it owns a secure
entry point for this query and if there are only secure delegations from the secure
entry point to the zone queried.
Because of the long1 and incremental deployement of DNSSEC, resolvers
will have to keep many trusted keys. The number of trusted keys needed for a
1 Transition duration could be long: for instance IPv6 deployement lasts since 1995
single resolver may be huge and not easy to store. Moreover, these zone keys are
periodically renewed and the resolver must update its trusted keys set to keep
consistent the keys.
In this paper we propose the creation of a new resource record allowing to
reduce the number of trusted keys needed in a resolver. In Section 2, we present
the definitions used in this paper and an overview of the DNSSEC processing.
In Section 3, we expose the problem of the islands of security model for the
resolvers. Section 4 defines the General Delegation Signer Resource Record and
its management. Then, in Section 5 we discuss the pros and cons of our method.
2 Validation process in DNSSEC
2.1 Definitions
In this subsection are explained the notations used in the document.
(1) A DNS domain X is the entire subtree included into the DNS tree be-
ginning at the node X . (2) A DNS zone is a node of the DNS tree. A zone
name is the concatenation of the node’s labels from its node to the root of
the DNS tree. A zone contains all the not delegated DNS names ended by the
zone name. For example, the zone example.com. contains all the not delegated
names X.example.com. where X can be composed by several labels. (3) A zone
can delegate the responsability of a part of its names. The zone example.com.
can delegate all the names ended by test.example.com. to a new zone. This
zone is named the test.example.com. zone. (4) RR means Resource Record,
the basic data unit in the domain name system. Each RR is associated to a
DNS name. Every RR is stored in a zone file and belongs to a zone. (5) Re-
source records with same name, class and type form a RRset. For example the
DNSKEY RRS of a zone form a DNSKEY RRset. (6) DNSKEY (key1) is the
RR which describes the key named key1. (7) RRSIG(X)y is the RR which is the
signature of the RR X generated with the private part of key y. (8) A trusted
key is the public part of a zone key, configured in a resolver. (9) A Secure Entry
Point is a zone for which the resolver trusts a key.
2.2 DNSSEC Chain of Trust
DNS security extensions define new resource records in order to store keys and
signatures needed to provide integrity and authentication.
Each secured zone owns at least one zone key, the public part of this key is
stored in a DNSKEY resource record. The private part of this key is kept secret
and should be stored in a secure location. The private part of the key generates
a digital signature for each resource record in the zone file. These signatures are
stored in a RRSIG resource record.
A resource record is considered valid when the verification of at least one of
its associated RRSIG RR is complete. Figure 1 shows the signature verification
process. In order to verify the signature of a resource record, the resolver cyphers
the RRSIG RR with the public key of the zone contained in the DNSKEY RR
present in the DNS response message. If the result of this operation, called
Resource Record’ in figure 1 is equal to Resource Record present in the DNS
response message, the signature is verified. Thus, the resource record is valid.
During the signature verification process, the zone key is needed and must
be verified too. This allows to avoid the use of a fake key sent in a message
forged by a malicious person. To trust a zone key, DNSSEC uses the DNS-tree
model to establish a chain of trust [11] beginning from a secure entry point
[12] to the queried zone. To create this chain, a verifiable relation between child
zone and parent zone must exist: this is the role of the Delegation Signer resource
record (DS RR) [13]. This record, stored in the parent zone, contains information
allowing the authentication of one child zone key. Figure 2 shows the validation
of a delegation.
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Fig. 2. The delegation verification process.
Once the signatures (the signature of the DS RR provided by the parent zone
and the signature of the DNSKEY provided by the child zone) are verified, the
resolver checks that information contained in one DS RR identifies one key in
the child zone. If one DS RR identifies one DNSKEY RR in the child zone, one
link of the chain of trust is built and the name resolution should progress to
secure the next link in the DNS tree. If there is no valid DS RR that identifies
one valid DNSKEY RR in the child zone, the chain of trust is broken and the
name resolution is unsecure.
3 DNSSEC Deployement and Islands of Security Model
Using DNSSEC is not mandatory for zone administrators, they are free to de-
ploy DNSSEC or not. Indeed, some administrators evaluate the overhead to
deploy DNSSEC too important compared to the need to secure their zone with
DNSSEC. Moreover, deploying DNSSEC software can raise some compatibil-
ity problems. Consequently, some parts of the DNS tree may be secure with
DNSSEC while some other parts may be unsecure (DNS only). This leads to an
islands of security model. An island of security is a subtree of the DNS tree en-
tirely secured with DNSSEC. The incremental deployment of DNSSEC implies
some remaining unsecure zones in the DNS tree and hence unsecure delegations.
As a resolver may send queries about any DNS name, it should be able to per-
form secure name resolution about any zone in any existing islands of security.
The first naive solution is to configure in each resolver the apex key of all existing
islands of security as trusted keys. Two major reasons prove this naive solution
can not be implemented: the set of keys needed is hard to manage (the DNS
tree is composed by several million of zones). And the zone keys are periodically
changed in order to resist to cryptoanalysis attack and should be updated in all
resolvers.
The idea discussed in this paper reduces the number of trusted keys needed
in a resolver. We define a new resource record: the General Delegation Signer
Resource Record (GDS RR) that is a generalization of the Delegation Signer
Resource Record (DS RR) [13]. The DS RR makes the link between parent and
child zones. With the GDS RR, we generalize this to a link between islands of
security. This generalization allows to avoid the gap of security created by an
unsecure zone and reduce the number of trusted keys needed for a resolver.
4 GDS resource record
The GDS resource record is a generalization of the the DS RR and for compati-
bility reasons we decide to create a new RR and to copy the DS RR format. This
allows to keep compatibility with the current validation process implemented in
DNS software. Old resolvers that understand only DS RR can continue to vali-
date RRs, even when GDS RRs are present. The management of the GDS RR is
slightly different from the DS management. The GDS resource record contains
the same four fields than these contained in a DS RR: key tag, algorithm, digest
type and the digest of a public key. The key tag is an identifier of the public key.
The algorithm field is the algorithm of the key. The digest type identifies the
digest algorithm used. The digest field contains the digest of the DNSKEY RR.
This format allows concise representation of the keys that the secure descendant
will use, thus keeping down the size of the answer for the delegation, reducing
the probability of DNS message overflow.
4.1 Management
In the DS management the only involved entities are one zone and its parent
zone. Figure 3 shows the current steps to create a DS RR when it is possible.
When a zone creates new keys (the zone becomes secured or changes a subset
of its keys), this zone notifies its parent zone in order to create DS RRs for
these keys. If the parent zone is secure, parent and child zones exchange data
needed for the DS RR creation(signed DNSKEY RR). The parent zone checks
the received material and then stores the new DS RR in its zone file. A secure
link is created between parent and child zones. The delegation signer model is
limited to a direct link between a parent zone and one of its child zone.
In the previous algorithm, the requirement for a zone to have a DS RR
referencing one of its keys is to have a secure parent. When the parent zone is
unsecure it does not store any DS RR for its secure child zones. Consequently, its
secure child zones are apex of islands of security. The keys of these zones must be
configured as trusted by resolvers that want to perform secure name resolution.
The GDS RR solves this problem of additional trusted keys configuration. If
a secure zone does not have a secure parent but has a closest secure ancestor
(CSA), a GDS RR stored in the CSA creates a secure link between the CSA and
the secure zone. GDS RRs stored in the CSA zone file allow to authenticate keys
of the secure zone and hence no additional trusted keys configuration is needed
in resolvers. The authentication of keys is the same as presented in figure 2 for
DS RR. A resolver sends a query about GDS RR identifying the key. It verifies
the signatures of the DNSKEY RR and of the GDS RR. Finally, it verifies that
the GDS RR identifies the key contained in the DNSKEY RR.
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Fig. 3. The current steps of DS creation.
A modification of the DS creation algorithm is needed for the creation of the
GDS RR when a secure zone creates keys. Two operations on keys can imply
the creation of GDS RR: a key rollover in a zone or a unsecure zone becomes
secure. Figure 4 shows the steps to follow during the creation of GDS RRs.
The first steps of this algorithm are similar to the current algorithm, because
when a DS RR authenticates a key of a given zone, no GDS RR is needed for
this key. If the zone that have created new key does not have a secure parent,
this secure zone must search its closest secure ancestor. Once, the zone finds its
CSA (queries about DNSKEY RR on ancestor zones are sufficient to decide if
an ancestor zone is secure or not), the zone exchanges its public keys with its
CSA to create GDS RR(s) in the CSA zone file. For the creation of GDS RR in
case of a zone key rollover, the previous steps are sufficient (see subsection 4.2).
In case of the creation of a new secure zone, to keep the unicity of secure
chain, the CSA must transmit to the new secure zone all the GDS RRs of the
zones which are in the subdomain of the new secure zone. When the new secure
zone receives these informations from its CSA, the new secure zone can create
the secure delegation for zones in its subdomain.
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Fig. 4. The steps of GDS creation.
The new secure zone has to send queries to its child zones only to verify that
RRs are effectively present. No other transactions are needed, because all data
needed for the creation of secure delegation are sent by its CSA.
4.2 Proof of concept
During a key rollover. The current key management in DNSSEC implies that
when a zone changes one of its key signing key (KSK), the DS RR identifying
this KSK must be updated to keep the chain of trust safe [14]. This management
is the same for the GDS RR. When a zone having a CSA, changes one of its
KSK the GDS RR identifying this key must be updated. So, the secure zone
must contact its CSA to update the GDS RR. The only change to make in the
CSA zone is the update of the GDS RR. The CSA does not have to transmit
GDS RR, because nothing is changed in the DNS-tree topology.
A zone becomes secure. When an unsecure zone becomes secure GDS RRs
must be created, the CSA of the zone should manage this set of GDS RRs.
Figure 5 shows the transmission of the GDS RRs between the CSA and the new
secure zone. Firstly, the new secure zone finds its CSA, and provides its keys.
Then, the CSA creates GDS RRs for the keys of the new secure zone. Finally,
the CSA transmits the GDS RR it owns for the descendants of the new secure
zone, because the new secure zone becomes the CSA of these descendant. The
new secure zone examines the GDS RRs received. If a GDS RR identifies a key
of one of its direct child, the new secure zone creates a DS RR and deletes the
GDS RR. The other GDS are kept in the zone file of the new secure zone.
We can notice that the chain of trust is keeping safe, a secure path always
exists between the islands of security. A resolver can perform secure name reso-
lution about all islands of security present in the tree with only one key of the
root zone configured as trusted. In the current model, a resolver that wants to
perform secure name resolution about all the islands of security present in the
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Fig. 5. The GDS RRs update and transmission.
tree must have configured one trusted key for every islands (for instance in figure
5 key1, key3 and key4 as trusted.
5 Pros and cons
The proposition described in this paper solves the scalability problem caused by
the large number of trusted keys needed in a resolver in order to perform secure
name resolutions. With GDS, only the keys of the apex of the upper islands of
security have to be configured in the resolver. With this proposition the number
of trusted keys in a resolver is easily manageable. Consequently, the incremental
deployment of DNSSEC is not anymore a problem to its early use. GDS has
been implemented during the IDsA project [15]. This implementation consists
on a modification of BIND software [16]. The modified resolver implemented
during the IDsA project is able to validate resource records trusting only the
root key and following the secure delegations. This resolver validates the secure
link existing between islands of security by verifying the GDS RRs.
Moreover, as GDS does not change anything in the existing DNSSEC speci-
fication (it does not change the management of existing RRs), it does not raise
any compatibility problem. Old DNS softwares just ignore resource records they
do not understand. Hence, name resolutions performed with old DNS software
succeed even if GDS RRs are present in some zones. The GDS RR provides
additional security between the islands of security because it emulates an en-
tire secure tree among secure zones. For instance, experiments show that, when
GDS is used, all DNS queries on a secure zone can be validated if one judicious
secure entry point has been configured in every resolver despite the presence of
numerous unsecure zones.
The main drawback of GDS is the additionnal records stored in the zone
files.Possible conflict may occur with the zone local policy if the zone does not
want to take care about (except from its child zones).
6 Conclusion
DNSSEC provides integrity and authentication to the Domain Name System. In
this paper, we have described a model solving the problem of the large number
of trusted keys needed in DNSSEC resolvers to perform secure name resolution.
GDS RRs provide secure links between islands of security and reduce the number
of trusted keys needed in a resolver. By storing GDS RRs in zone file, the trusted
keys management becomes easier for the DNS administrator because of the very
small number of keys needed.
Moreover, the GDS model provides a gain of security. Even without a trusted
key configured for a given secure zone, a resolver can perform secure name reso-
lution about this zone. The chain of trust is provided automatically by the GDS
RRs linking the islands of security.
The GDS RR is implemented and does not raise any compatibility problem
with standard DNSSEC. Its use implies a very low overhead, an easier manage-
ment of the resolver trusted keys set and ensures a larger secure access to the
domain name space.
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